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The Influence of Professional
Investors on the Failure of
Management Buyout Attempts
Sarah W. Peck
College of Business Administration, University of Iowa
Iowa City, IA

Abstract: In a sample of 111 MBO offers between 1984 and 1987, almost
30% attract new blockholders. These blockholders are primarily professional
investors who act to facilitate a takeover by a higher bidder, thus increasing
returns to both themselves and other public shareholders. In contrast, I find
little evidence that pre-existing blockholders, particularly institutional holders,
affect either the offer outcome or actively participate in the buyout contest
once it begins. The overall pattern of results suggests that professional
investors, particularly equity-holding companies, are 'control specialists' who
provide valuable services as brokers in the market for corporate control.

1. Introduction
Academic researchers have long recognized the incentives to
acquire blocks during control contests. Jensen and Ruback (1983) are
the first to point out that ‘(t)akeover specialists, sometimes referred to
as ‘raiders’ -who acquire specialized expertise in takeover strategy and
in ferreting out and amassing a controlling block of shares–perform an
important function in facilitating transfers of control’. My research
focuses on management buyout offers (MBO). I investigate the extent
of block acquisitions by professional investors during these control
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contests and the role these blockholders play vis-a-vis pre-existing
blockholders in the contest resolution.
Two characteristics of MBO offers make them suitable events for
an initial investigation into the role of professional investors in control
contests. First, in an MBO there is an inherent conflict of interest
between management and shareholders over the price offered for the
firm. Managers have a fiduciary duty to maximize share value. Yet,
they also have an incentive to sell the firm to themselves as cheaply
as possible. Researchers (see DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice, 1984;
Lowenstein, 1985; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1987; Kaplan, 1989) have
discussed possible safeguards against managerial self-dealing. The
acquisition of a block is one such safeguard. Professional investors who
can detect managerial self-dealing might be able to extract a higher
premium for both themselves and/or other shareholders.
Second, there is uncertainty that management will succeed in its
bid to acquire the firm. While most research focuses on successful
MBOs (see DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice, 1984; Kaplan, 1989; Smith,
1990), MBO offers are not usually ‘done deals’ when they are
announced. Kaplan (1989) documents that many MBO attempts are
contested, and many fail. When an MBO fails, the firm is often taken
over by a higher bidder. Uncertainty about the success of MBO
attempts provides opportunities for professional investors to improve
offer prices.
The results of this study show that professional investors act to
improve the terms of buyout offers to shareholders. Many MBO
attempts attract professional investors, particularly those in equityholding companies, who take actions to facilitate the takeover of the
firm by either themselves or a third party at a higher price.
Furthermore, these new blockholders seem to fill a niche in the
monitoring function of outside blockholders. Pre-existing blockholders,
particularly institutional holders, do not seem to affect the outcome of
the offer, and do not actively participate in negotiations once the
contest begins.
This study makes three contributions. First, the importance of
new blockholders is demonstrated. Prior research suggests that the ex
ante level of stock ownership concentration and its division between
management and outsiders is important in determining the likelihood
of a takeover (see Manne, 1965; Bradley, 1980; Grossman and Hart,
1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Harris and Raviv, 1988; Stulz,
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1988). In this research, the ex post changes in ownership
concentration are important to the ultimate contest outcome.
Second, this study expands the notion of the set of players in
the market for corporate control. Prior research has demonstrated
empirically the importance of the role of managers, existing
blockholders (see Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jensen and Warner,
1988; and the references therein), competitive bidders (see Bradley,
Desai, and Kim, 1988), and boards of directors (see Byrd and
Hickman, 1992). The evidence presented here shows that professional
investors are also active, influential players in control contests.
Third, this study builds on similar findings by prior researchers.
Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) investigate a sample of block
acquisitions of 5% or more of a company’s stock, and find that about
half are associated with a takeover proposal. While block acquisitions
are usually made by companies that eventually take over the firm,
some block acquisitions are made by professional investors (defined as
frequent purchasers) who rarely take over the firm. Mikkelson and
Ruback (1985) do not investigate whether these investors acquire
shares in anticipation of a takeover or to actively participate in the
contest; this study does. Holderness and Sheehan (1986) find that
after there. has been a block acquisition by a professional investor,
some firms are eventually taken over by a third party, but do not
document the actions these investors take to facilitate the takeover.
Holderness and Sheehan's study is also limited to six controversial
investors/’raiders’. This study adds to our knowledge of the role of
takeover specialists by reporting the details of the types of
professional investors (both frequent acquirers or ‘raiders’ and equityholding companies) and the actions they take during MBO events.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the sample,
measurement, and definition of outside blockholdings, and
characteristics of MBO contests. Section 3 documents the extent of
changes in outside blockholdings around an MBO offer, and presents
evidence on the role professional investors play in the buyout contest.
Section 4 concludes.

2. The sample
This section describes the sample design and data collection. I
provide a detailed description on the various definitions of outside
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blockholders that I use in this study. I also provide descriptive
statistics of MBO contests.

2.1. Sample design and data
I obtain a preliminary sample of 90 management buyout
attempts from 1984 to 1987 from the Dow Jones News/Retrieval
Service by searching for articles containing the following words or
phrases: ‘management buyout’, ‘leveraged buyout’, ‘LBO’, ‘MBO’,
‘going private’, and ‘taken private’. An MBO attempt is defined as any
announcement in which top management, either alone or with a group
of equity investors, makes an offer to buy the firm. Forty-eight
additional management buyout attempts are identified using a sample
provided by Steven Kaplan.1 Seventeen firms are eliminated because
of insufficient return data on either the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) or CRSP/NASDAQ tapes to estimate market model
returns. Eight firms are eliminated because they are not reported by
Standard & Poor’s. Therefore, data on institutional shareholdings are
unavailable. Five firms are eliminated because The Insider's Chronicle
did not report data on inside holdings (The Insider's Chronicle began
publishing after the relevant dates). The final sample consists of 111
firms and includes buyouts initiated by both management and outside
parties.
The primary sources of data for events during the MBO contest
are the Wall Street Journal and the Dow Jones News Wire. For each
firm in the sample I read all articles and news releases for the year
prior to the initial buyout announcement to two years after or when
the firm becomes private and ceased to have its activities reported in
the financial press. I collect event dates and other relevant data for
each event for the following general categories: initial buyout
announcement, management actions, actions by independent
directors, actions by minority shareholders, actions by outside bidders,
and the buyout outcome. I also collect data on the level of inside
holdings and total equity value. I obtain data on the level of inside
ownership concentration the year prior to the MBO offer from the
firm's proxy statement in the year prior to the MBO offer. Since proxy
statements do not always occur one year prior to the offer, I adjust
these data using The Insider's Chronicle. I obtain data on total equity
value the month prior to the initial buyout offer using share price and
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shares outstanding data from either the CRSP or CRSP/NASDAQ tapes,
or Standard & Poor’s Monthly Security Owner’s Stock Guide.

2.2. Data on outside blockholders
Data on outside block holders are available because of SEC
disclosure requirements. The SEC requires that institutional investors
who own, in aggregate, $100 million or more of equity securities must
file a 13F form. Institutional investors who own 5% or more of the
shares outstanding of an individual firm (and when the investment is
made in the ordinary course of business and without the intention of
changing or influencing control of the firm) must file a 13G form. Both
forms must be filed quarterly. Institutional investors typically own 1 %
of a firm’s shares outstanding (see Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 1988);
in my sample the average holding is 1.48%. (Because of potential
reporting lags for institutional holdings, all tests are rerun using the
highest level of institutional holdings obtained in either the year prior
to the MBO offer or the two years after the MBO offer. The results are
qualitatively the same for all tests.) An individual investor or company
who owns 5% of the shares outstanding must file a schedule 13D
within ten days of reaching the 5% threshold. The investor must also
state whether the purpose of the acquisition is to change or influence
control of the firm. Any changes in the initial 13D, 13F, or 13G form
must be reported in amended filings. The SEC also requires outside
investors who own a block or 5% or more (whether a 13G or 13D filer)
to disclose their holdings in the firm’s annual proxy statement.
Both 13D and institutional blockholders are included in this
investigation. Pre-existing blockholders are those who own blocks at
the time of the announcement of the MBO offer. Since professional
investors are likely to acquire a block either to anticipate an offer or to
precipitate an offer, I distinguish between pre-existing blockholders
who have held a block for at least a year and those that have only
recently acquired a block. Old blockholders are defined as investors
who own a block 12 months prior to the MBO offer. New pre-offer
blockholders are defined as investors who make their initial block
investment during the year before the MBO offer. New post-offer
blockholders are those investors who make their initial investment
after the MBO offer. All of my hypotheses concern the role of new
post-offer blockholders in the contest.
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Data on the level of old institutional holdings are obtained from
Standard & Poor’s Monthly Security Owner’s Stock Guide. I obtain data
on the level of old 13D outside blockholdings from the firm's proxy
statement in the year prior to the initial buyout announcement.
Because not all proxy statements occur exactly one year prior to the
MBO offer, all data are adjusted using the Dow Jones News Wire or the
Wall Street Journal. I assume that all 5% investors listed in the firm’s
proxy statement that are not institutional investors are 13D filers. [I
identify institutional investors using the classifications in Brickley,
Lease, and Smith (1988).] This method potentially understates the
level of old 13D blockholdings. I rerun tests, assuming all 5%
blockholders reported in the proxy statement are 13D filers. The
results are qualitatively the same for all tests. Data on new
blockholders are taken from reports in the Dow Jones News Wire or
the Wall Street Journal of block acquisitions.
Using reports of 13D filings rather than the actual filings
themselves can create potential data problems. First, to the extent
that not all SEC filings are reported in the Wall Street Journal or the
Dow Jones News Wire, new block acquisitions are under-reported in
the sample. Second, reporting lags can lead to some new pre-offer
blockholders being misclassified as new post-offer blockholders. To
correct for this problem, I assume a one- month lag for all block
acquisitions or changes in blockholdings reported in the financial press.
In addition, I show in Table 3 the adjusted number of days between
the MBO announcement and the first report of the 13D filing for new
post-offer blockholders. On average, new post-offer block acquisitions
occur between four to five months after the MBO announcement,
indicating that any remaining reporting lags are unlikely to lead to
misclassifications.
I also analyze changes in blockholdings over the event period.
Data on monthly changes in 13D filings are taken from reports of
amended 13D filings in the Wall Street Journal or an announcement
over the Dow Jones New Wire. Data on changes in individual
institutional investor holdings are not available. However, data on
monthly changes in total institutional holdings are available from
Standard & Poor’s Monthly Security Owner’s Stock Guide.
I also search the financial press for changes in institutional
holdings. Using the classifications in Brickley, Lease, and Smith
(1988), I find a few instances of 13D filings by institutional investors
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and report these in Table 4. I find only one report of a block
acquisition by a 13G filer, who was later sued by the firm for not filing
a 13D.
The type of blockholder is also reported, i.e., whether the
blockholder is a professional investor, institution, miscellaneous
corporation, or individual. Data on old blockholder types for 5%
blockholders (whether 13G or 13D) are obtained from the firm’s proxy
statement. Data on new blockholder types are taken from reports in
the financial press. Data on the types of actions blockholders take
(other than an acquisition of shares) are obtained from reports in the
financial press.

2.3. Sample characteristics of MBO contests
Table 1 shows the possible outcomes of MBO offers. One of its
most interesting findings is the low success rate of management
buyout attempts. Management successfully acquires the firm only 66%
of the time. If the management buyout fails, the firm is taken over by
an outside party 63% of the time. Intervening events between the
management buyout offer and the final acquisition of the firm are
likely to affect the probability that management successfully acquires
the firm. In my sample, buyout transactions take an average of seven
months to complete. The lengthy time needed to complete the buyout
reinforces the notion that management buyout offers are often
contested, and that the transition of the firm from public to private
status is a protracted process.
To understand the contest, it is important to have in mind the
process and its stylized facts. (Table 2 reports the frequency and
chronology of events during the buyout contest, and the stock price
reaction to these events.) An MBO contest begins with the
announcement that management, either alone or with a group of
equity investors, has made an offer to buy the firm. Simultaneously, a
committee of independent directors is usually formed to evaluate the
offer and to consider competing bids, often with the help of an
independent investment banker and/or lawyers retained by the
committee. The formation of a committee of independent directors is
reported 64% of the time.
After the initial offer is made, the bid can be contested by an
outside third party. Twenty-three percent of the time an outside third
party (other than a blockholder) makes a higher offer to acquire the
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firm. Most of these bids occur within three months of the MBO offer
and are associated with a positive stock price reaction of 7.89%.
Shareholders can also contest the offer. Minority shareholders
litigate the fairness of the MBO offer or the fairness of antitakeover
defenses 40% of the time. The stock price reaction associated with
minority shareholder litigation is negative but insignificant, which
suggests such litigation is ineffective in increasing the offer price. In
contrast, actions, other than the acquisition of the block itself, taken
by either old or new blockholders, which occurs about 30% of the
time, are associated with a positive stock price reaction of 13.05%.
When I exclude announcements that include reports of block
acquisitions, the remaining announcements (that a blockholder has
taken some type of action after the MBO offer) are associated with a
statistically significant three-day abnormal return of 15.11 %. A
blockholder as a large shareholder is likely to have more leverage over
the offer. In addition to litigating the fairness of either the offer or the
antitakeover defenses, a blockholder could achieve membership on the
board and meet with executives, thereby gaining access to nonpublic
company information. Such inside information can allow him to devise
a better restructuring plan under which either management offers a
higher premium or the firm is sold to a higher bidder. Blockholders can
also exert pressure on management’s bid by making a higher offer for
the firm themselves. Furthermore, opportunities to achieve a higher
premium through any of these actions is likely to attract new
blockholders. Table 2 shows that announcements of a post-offer block
acquisition occur about 30% of the time and are associated with a
positive stock price reaction of 5.49%.
The board of directors can also contest management’s offer. The
evidence shows that the board does so infrequently; only 8% of the
time is there an announcement that the board has rejected
management’s offer. However, it is likely that management does not
make a buyout offer without first getting the board’s approval. The few
announcements of the board rejecting management’s offer are
associated with a significantly positive stock price reaction. This is
consistent with previous research, which finds that independent
directors provide an important monitoring function during control
contests (see Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Brickley, Coles, and Terry,
1994).
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The management group can respond in several ways to a
contested offer. Management either revises its offer and/or takes some
type of antitakeover action, such as litigation of the outside bidder. For
all the MBOs in the sample, management revises its offer about half
the time; announcements of these revisions are accompanied with a
positive stock price reaction of 7.87%. Management also takes actions
to resist a takeover 16% of the time. Managerial resistance is defined
as taking anyone of the following actions: adopting an antitakeover
amendment; litigating an outside bidder; and increasing
management’s effective stake by buying back shares, debt for equity
swap, repurchase of convertible preferred or convertible debt for cash,
private placement of equity, or repurchase of shares from an investor.
Dann and DeAngelo (1988) show that buyback capital transactions can
be defensive in nature. However, it is also likely that some of these
transactions are related to the financing of the buyout and are
misclassified as resistive. Table 2 shows that many managers take
countering actions before the MBO offer which suggests that
management anticipates its offer will be contested.
Thus, the typical scenario of the MBO contest described above
provides a context in which to evaluate the influence of professional
investors on the outcome. The preliminary evidence indicates that
other players – besides professional investors, i.e., outside third
parties, management, minority shareholders and independent directors
– can be involved in setting the buyout premium and determining who
ultimately acquires the firm.

3. Evidence on the role of professional investors
during MBO contests
This section further explores the role of professional investors,
while controlling for the participation of other players in the contest.

3.1. Increases in outside blockholdings around MBO
offers
Changes in the level of both institutional and 13D blockholdings
(as a percentage of shares outstanding) are shown in Fig. 1. Both
initial and amended 13D filings are included in the measure of 13D
holdings. A total of 263 13D filings are reported in the sample; 204 of
these are purchase transactions and 59 are sales transactions. The
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majority of these transactions are open market. Only 21 filings are
reported as negotiated trades. I calculate total 13D blockholdings as
the sum of each 13D blockholder’s highest holdings within that month.
With month zero denoting when the offer is announced, both types of
blockholdings are shown from month – 12 to month + 24, or until the
buyout is completed. I adjust the percentage of shares owned by
outside blockholders for any changes in total shares outstanding.
Reports of 13D filings are adjusted for a one-month lag, and reports of
institutional holdings are adjusted for a three-month lag.
Fig. 1 shows that total outside block holdings increase around
MBO offers, peaking three months before the offer. The decline in
outside ownership concentration afterwards roughly corresponds to the
completion rate of the buyouts. Blockholdings of 13D filers increase by
about 18%, from 14.54% at month – 12 to the highest average value
of 17.11% in month 2. The increase in 13D holdings after the MBO
announcement in Fig. 1 appears erratic because both the rate of
buyout completions and the rate of block acquisitions vary across
firms. Blockholdings for institutions increase by 16%, from 31.53% at
month –12 to the highest average value of 37.44% at month –3.
Table 3 reports the average size of a block acquisition by both
new and old blockholders. The table shows that MBO offers attract new
blockholders, who account for the majority of the block acquisitions
both before and after the MBO announcement. Fifty-five new investors
acquire a block before the offer, while only four old blockholders
increase the size of their block. Thirty-five new block acquisitions are
made after the offer, while new pre-offer blockholders increase the
size of their holdings only eight times and old blockholders do so only
four times.
Table 3 shows that there are incentives for new investors to
acquire a block both before and after the MBO offer. There are three
reasons why it is difficult to test the incentives for a block acquisition
before the offer. First, a random sample of firms is needed to test
whether a block acquisition increases the probability of an MBO offer; I
have a nonrandom sample of MBO offers. Second, it is difficult to test
whether pre-offer blockholders increase the initial offer price. For this
test, I need the price that management would have offered without
pressure from the blockholder; this price is unobservable. Third, many
cases in which pre-offer blockholders facilitate a takeover are not likely
to be included in my sample. Management is unlikely to make an MBO
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offer if there is a high probability that such an offer will fail. However, I
am able to provide evidence on the types of blockholders who acquire
blocks before the MBO announcement and the type of actions they
take. The evidence suggests that blockholders who acquire a block
before the MBO offer play an important role in precipitating the offer.

3.2. Control versus arbitrage
MBO offers can create profit opportunities for two types of
professional investors: arbitragers (or inside traders) or control
specialists. While both types can influence the premium by implicitly
refusing to tender/vote their shares at the original offer price, control
specialists distinguish themselves by taking additional actions (such as
litigating the fairness of the offer) that further escalate the premium.
Thus, the distinction between arbitrage and control motives for
professional investors is important, because each has a different
implication for shareholder wealth. Furthermore, when investors trade
exclusively for arbitrage or inside information reasons it is empirically
difficult to infer the direction of causality between block acquisitions by
professional investors and higher offers. Observing block acquisitions
prior to higher offers is consistent with both the hypotheses that
blockholder pressure causes higher offers and that information about
higher offers (whether obtained illegally or through arbitrage
expertise) causes block acquisitions. When blockholders take actions,
it is easier to infer causality; rational blockholders will not take costly
actions unless they expect to be compensated by an increase in the
offer premium as a result of these actions.
The two motivations for block ownership are not mutually
exclusive, but professional investors who take actions during the
buyout contest cannot be strictly classified as arbitragers. I classify
investors who take no action during the buyout contest as passive
blockholders and blockholders who take actions during the buyout
contest as active blockholders. Some passive blockholders, however,
could be misclassified, since blockholders can take unreported actions
to influence the outcome of the contest.
Table 4 reports the different types of blockholders who own
shares either before or after the MBO offer. This table contains two
findings that show most of the time, block acquisitions are made by
control specialists in response to the MBO offer. First, the majority of
investors acquiring shares are best characterized as control
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specialists/arbitragers (24 out of 35): They are professional investors
who repeatedly acquire blocks in firms involved in control contests.
Table 4 shows that these blockholders are primarily frequent acquirers
and equity-holding companies.2 Furthermore, both frequent acquirers
and equity-holding companies have been characterized as control
specialists and/or arbitragers elsewhere; thus the characterization of
blockholders as control specialists and/or arbitragers is not unique to
this study (see Holderness and Sheehan, 1985; Mikkelson and Ruback,
1985; Miller, 1986). Second, about half of these new post-offer block
acquisitions are made by investors who take actions during the contest
(17 active versus 18 passive). In addition, Table 4 shows that new
pre-offer blockholders are most likely to be control
specialists/arbitragers who are active during the contest.
Table 4 compares the types of new post-offer investors to preexisting blockholders. In contrast to new blockholders, old
blockholders are more likely to be institutions.3 Such investors make
up 89 out of 143 old blockholders. Table 4 also shows that institutional
investors are less likely to increase their holdings during the contest.
Only nine old blockholders acquire more shares either in the year
before the offer or afterwards. SEC filing requirements for institutional
investors could explain why old blockholders do not acquire additional
shares during MBO contests. The SEC requires that institutional filers
do not intend to change or influence control of the firm. These
requirements are likely to decrease incentives to develop expertise in
identifying low offers and/or to negotiate for a better offer. In addition,
other regulations could rule out block acquisitions by institutional
investors (see Roe, 1990). Finally, Table 4 shows that old blockholders
are less likely to take observable actions during the MBO contest. Only
13 out of 143 old block holders are active compared with 45 out of 90
new blockholders.
Table 5 reports the type of actions that new blockholders take.
Table 5 also provides direct evidence in support of causality as well as
insight into the methods blockholders use to influence both the buyout
price and the buyout outcome. Table 5 includes the frequency of the
different types of actions taken which are cross-tabulated with the
types of blockholders in the sample. Table 5 shows that the investors I
call ‘control specialists/arbitragers’ account for the majority of the
actions taken by new post-offer blockholders. Bidding is the action
most often taken by new post-offer blockholders (49% of the time)
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and can reflect the blockholders’ attempt to take over the firm at a
higher price than management offered. (Blockholders do, in fact,
successfully take over the firm about 15 % of the time.) Bidding can
also be used as a tactic to elicit a higher bid. Professional investors can
signal to other bidders the price at which they will relinquish control of
their shares. Other bidders will match the blockholder’s bid as long as
the blockholder’s offer is credible. Control specialists, i.e., frequent
acquirers, have a reputation for making value-increasing changes in
the firm by shaking up existing management, by finding a new
management team, or, as a last resort, by acquiring the firm and
making the changes themselves (see Holderness and Sheehan, 1985).
Anecdotal evidence illustrates this alternative view: In the case
of the Fruehauf MBO attempt, Asher Edelman acquired a block, then
made a higher bid for the firm after management allied with a group of
investors led by Merrill Lynch made a buyout offer. The Wall Street
Journal (August 8, 1986) reports: ‘Indeed, sources said that Edelman
and his advisors were ‘shocked’ at the Merrill Lynch group’s failure to
increase its offer. The Edelman Group had publicly indicated a
willingness to bid $49.50, and one source said they had expected the
Merrill Lynch Group to bid at least $50 a share, outbidding Edelman
and guaranteeing the New York investor a large profit on his holdings.
Instead, the Edelman group may now find itself owning all of
Fruehauf.’ Subsequently, a higher bid was made. Edelman did not end
up acquiring the firm.
The second most frequent action (15% of the time) is opposition
to the MBO offer via proxy fights, litigation, or publicly stating the new
blockholders are against the offer. This action can increase the
blockholder’s bargaining position with management (the blockholder
can agree to stop his actions in exchange for a higher offer) or by
delaying the completion of the MBO, it can give higher bidders time to
emerge (see Jarrell, 1985).
Third, blockholders can elicit a higher bid by devising a superior
restructuring plan that warrants a higher premium (20% of the time).
Blockholders can state that they are working on such a plan, that they
are meeting with executives and gaining access to nonpublic company
records, or that they are obtaining a temporary board seat.
Actions taken to thwart the MBO offer or that reflect
participation in the restructuring, can be used to elicit a higher offer
from another party or as part of a takeover attempt by the control
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specialist/arbitrager himself. For example, a blockholder that makes a
bid for the firm also litigates management as part of his takeover
strategy. However, there is no significant association between bidding
and other actions taken by control specialists/arbitragers (for actions
to thwart MBO attempt, chi-square = 0.027, p-value = 0.87, and for
participation in restructuring, chi-square = 0.285, p-value = 0.59).
This finding suggests that occasionally, the other actions are taken as
part of a takeover attempt, and sometimes they are taken to elicit a
higher offer from another party.
I also investigate actions taken by new pre-offer blockholders.
As Table 5 shows, investors who acquire a block before the MBO offer
are active both before and after the offer. There is also no significant
difference between the actions taken by investors who acquire a block
before and those who acquire a block after the MBO offer. Bidding,
waging a proxy fight, litigating to drop antitakeover defenses, meeting
with executives, etc., are all actions that are likely to be perceived by
management as a takeover threat and prompt an MBO offer. However,
Table 5 shows that frequent acquirers account for more of the actions
taken by new pre-offer blockholders, while equity-holding companies
account for more of the actions taken by new post-offer blockholders.
This finding suggests that different types of professional investors play
different roles in; MBO contests; one type of investor, i.e., frequent
acquirers, precipitates offers, while another, i.e., equity holding
companies, contests them.

3.3. Professional investors and pre-existing outside
blockholders
I define pre-existing blockholders as old 13D blockholders, new
pre-offer blockholders, and institutional holders reported as of the
month of the MBO offer. The control specialist’s power depends in part
on the character of those pre-existing blockholders. If pre-existing
blockholders are aligned with management, they are likely to vote
against the new blockholder and neutralize his voting power. In
contrast, if pre-existing blockholders are not aligned with
management, they have an incentive to vote for the higher offer, and
thus become the newcomer’s ally. However, if pre-existing
blockholders are already involved in negotiating the offer, the new
investor is less likely to gain from entering into negotiations; ongoing
actions can already have achieved a higher premium. The incentive to
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be an active control specialist thus depends on the behavior of preexisting blockholders.
There is no significant correlation between a new post-offer
block acquisition and the percentage of shares outstanding held by old
13D outside blockholders (correlation coefficient = -0.10, p-value =
0.30). A new post-offer block acquisition is positively correlated with
the total percentage of shares outstanding held by institutions
(correlation coefficient = 0.06, p-value = 0.56). These findings
suggest that both institutional holders and old 13D blockholders do not
substitute for new investors in negotiating during the contest. The
correlations between old 13D and institutional holdings and a new preoffer block acquisition are similar. A new pre-offer block acquisition is
not significantly correlated with the level of old 13D outside
blockholdings (correlation coefficient = 0.01, p-value = 0.93), but is
positively correlated with the level of preexisting institutional holdings
(correlation coefficient = 0.26, p-value = 0.01).
In contrast, a new post-offer block acquisition is negatively
correlated with the percentage of shares outstanding held by new preoffer blockholders (correlation coefficient = -0.14, p-value = 0.08).
This finding suggests that new pre- and post-offer blockholders
substitute for each other in negotiating for a higher offer. Additional
evidence presented in the following sections suggests that new preoffer blockholders generate ‘high’ initial offers, while new post-offer
blockholders contest ‘low’ initial offers.

3.4. A higher buyout offer versus ‘side payments’
Professional investors can acquire a block in anticipation of
receiving side payments from management and/or a higher buyout
premium from either management or a third party. The best-known
side payment is ‘greenmail’, in which management buys back such
blocks at a premium above the current market price. Another practice
is for management to offer blockholders participation in post-buyout
equity.
Professional investors receive side payments infrequently. New
post-offer blockholders who are control specialists/arbitragers
participate in post-buyout equity in only three firms (however, these
cases are best characterized as ‘takeovers’ rather than ‘deals’ worked
out with management), and never accept some other type of side
payment (see Table 5). The findings for new pre-offer blockholders
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who are control specialists/arbitragers are similar. These investors
participate in post-buyout equity in only one firm, and accept some
other type of side payment only three times (see Table 5).
Table 6 reports the Spearman rank correlations between a
higher offer (from either management or an outside bidder other than
a blockholder) after the initial MBO offer and new block acquisitions
made before the higher offer. New blockholders that are corporations
are differentiated from control specialists/arbitragers, since the latter
are more important to the hypothesis concerning the role of
professional investors in the contest.4 I make distinctions between
active and passive blockholders; I also distinguish between when these
actions are taken. Actions before the offer are likely to lead to higher
initial offers, while actions after the offer are likely to lead to higher
subsequent offers. Table 6 includes other contest events that are likely
to have an effect on the probability of a higher offer. I include both
events that occur in the year prior to the MBO offer and events that
occur after the MBO offer but before the higher offer. I also examine
the relation between pre-existing ownership structure and the
likelihood of a higher offer. Variables that measure pre-existing
ownership structure include inside holdings, institutional holdings, the
level of old 13D blockholdings, and dummy variables for different
types of new pre-offer blockholders.
Table 6 shows that, as predicted, a higher offer is significantly,
positively correlated with both the post-offer acquisition of a block by a
control specialist/arbitrager (either active or passive) after the MBO
offer, but before the higher offer, and with a pre-offer acquisition of a
block by a control specialist/arbitrager who takes actions after the
offer. Size is also positively correlated with a higher offer. It is likely
that larger buyouts are subject to more bidding.
Table 6 also reports the results of a multivariate logit
regression. It shows that statistically the effects of a new post-offer
acquisition by an active control specialist/arbitrager are only weakly
significant after controlling for other variables. However,
multicollinearity between a new post-offer acquisition by an active
control specialist/arbitrager and other variables is likely to decrease
the chance that all are found significant in a regression. A new postoffer acquisition of a block by an active control specialist/arbitrager is
both positively correlated with a new post-offer acquisition by a
passive control specialist/arbitrager (correlation coefficient = 0.14, p-
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value = 0.15) and a new pre-offer acquisition by a control
specialist/arbitrager who takes actions after the offer (correlation
coefficient = 0.17, p-value = 0.07).
An alternative dependent variable is the percentage change in
the premium offered. However, buyout offers sometimes consist of a
mix of both cash and newly issued securities. So a percentage change
in the offer cannot be easily calculated. For a subsample of firms with
all cash offers (n = 59), I calculate a percentage change in the
premium offered. For firms with a new post-offer block acquisition by
an active control specialist/arbitrager the average change in the
premium for cash offers is 13.91 % (median = 21.54%, n = 5) but
only 2.14% (median = 0%, n = 54) for firms with no new post-offer
block acquisition by an active control specialist/arbitrager. This
difference is statistically significant at the 7% level, using a Wilcoxon
sign rank t-test. In contrast, for firms with a new pre-offer block
acquisition by an active control specialist/arbitrager the change in the
premium for cash offers (mean = 9.18%, median = 0%, n = 9) is not
statistically different from firms with no new pre-offer block acquisition
by an active control specialist/arbitrager (mean = 2.05%, median =
0%, n = 50). However, it is likely that a new pre-offer block
acquisition by an active control specialist/arbitrager ensures that offers
are fair to begin with.

3.5. Block acquisitions and the buyout outcome
Takeover specialists can increase returns to shareholders, either
by taking over the firm themselves or by facilitating a takeover by a
higher third party bidder (see Holderness and Sheehan, 1986; Jensen
and Ruback, 1983). Thus, professional investors can influence who
acquires the firm as well as the price paid for the firm.
Table 7 shows that the success of an outside party takeover is
positively correlated with a new post-offer block acquisition by an
active control specialist/arbitrager. All of these takeovers occur at a
higher price than that offered by management. Thus, this finding
supports the hypothesis that professional investors are more likely to
acquire a block when the management bid is ‘low’. In contrast, there is
no significant correlation between the success of an outside party
takeover and a new pre-offer block acquisition by a control
specialist/arbitrager who takes actions either before or after the offer.
However, it is unlikely that managers make an MBO offer without
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receiving the prior cooperation of large blockholders. An outside party
takeover is also significantly correlated with a new post-offer block
acquisition by a corporation. These companies are likely to acquire a
‘toe-hold’ to increase the probability of a successful bid (see Walking,
1985; Edminster and Walking, 1985). Finally, an outside party
takeover is significantly and negatively correlated with the level of
inside holdings and old 13D outside holdings. This finding is consistent
with Stulz's (1988) prediction that large inside holdings give managers
the power to resist an outside takeover. This finding also suggests that
old 13D blockholders are aligned with management during the buyout
contest.
Table 7 reports the results of a multivariate logit regression. A
block acquisition made after the offer by an active control
specialist/arbitrager continues to significantly increase the likelihood of
an outside party takeover. Four out of 24 or 20% of these takeovers
are completed by control specialists/arbitragers, and the remaining
80% are completed by corporations. Overall, the evidence indicates
that control specialists both ‘facilit(ate) transfers of control’ to a thirdparty at a higher price and ‘take control’ of the firm for themselves
(see Jensen and Ruback, 1983). These findings are consistent with
those of other researchers. Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) find that
there are acquisitions by frequent purchasers who rarely take over the
firm; Holderness and Sheehan (1985) find that after a block
acquisition by a ‘raider’ three firms are reorganized by the raiders
themselves, whereas ten firms are reorganized by third parties.

5. Summary and conclusion
I document changes in outside blockholdings around MBO
attempts. Outside ownership concentration increases around the time
of an MBO offer. Much of the increase takes the form of newly
accumulated blocks held temporarily by professional investors who
play an active role in the buyout contest. Their participation increases
the likelihood that the MBO fails, and the firm is taken over by either
the professional investor or a higher third-party bidder. The overall
weight of the evidence supports the hypothesis that block acquisitions
by professional investors increase buyout premiums earned by
shareholders.
While the findings of this study are specific to the role of
ownership structure in MBO contests, they also have general
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implications for that role in the firm. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) explain
cross-sectional variation in ownership structure by looking at different
characteristics of firms at the same point in ‘calendar time’. Rather
than observing cross-sectional variation in the levels of outside
ownership, my research investigates changes in outside ownership
concentration conditional on a particular event, the announcement of
an MBO offer. This is an example of the general proposition that
incentives to concentrate outside ownership are likely to vary over
time, as the value of corporate control changes. Other examples are
provided by Dodd and Warner (1983), who find that the value of the
vote attached to shares increases around proxy contests, and Gilson
(1990), who finds outside block ownership increases in firms
undergoing bankruptcy. Other major corporate events are potential
areas for future research.
Finally, this research adds to the recent empirical literature on
the various roles of blockholders in monitoring management (see
Holderness and Sheehan 1985; Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 1988;
Barclay and Holderness, 1989). Different types of blockholders are
likely to have different comparative advantages in monitoring various
types of managerial activities. In an MBO contest, managers have an
inherent conflict of interest with shareholders since they have no
incentive to offer their best price for the firm. The evidence presented
in this study indicates that pre-existing blockholders do not actively
negotiate during the MBO contest. Instead, new blockholders who are
control specialists provide these negotiating benefits to shareholders.
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Notes


I am grateful for Steven Kaplan's generosity in supplying his
sample. This sample consists of both successful and unsuccessful
management buyouts. The successful buyouts include all buyouts
of at least $100 million that are announced or completed between
1984 and 1987. He also includes an incomplete sample of buyouts
1
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that are worth less than $100 million. The failed buyouts include all
failed buyouts announced between 1984 and 1985 of at least $50
million.


2

The blockholders in the sample whom I classify as frequent
acquirers are: Victor Posner, Asher Edelman, the Bass brothers,
Paul Bilzerian, Ivan Boesky, Carl Icahn, Irwin Jacobs, Samuel
Belzberg, the Dart Group, Ronald Perelman, and David Murdoch.
Examples of some of the blockholders in my sample that I classify
as equity-holding companies are: Jamie Securities Co., Gabelli
Group, and Mutual Shares Corp.



3



4

Following Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988), I classify the
following investors as institutional investors: insurance companies,
banks, nonbank trusts, pension fund trusts, mutual funds,
endowments, private pension funds, brokerage houses, investment
counsel firms, and miscellaneous financial service firms.
There are two active new post-offer blockholders (an investment
counsel firm and a miscellaneous financial service firm) included as
control specialists/arbitragers in the tests reported in Tables 6 and
7.
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Appendix
Table 1. Frequency of outcomes of management buyout attempts for a sample of 111
firms in the period 1984 to 1987. A management buyout attempt is defined as any
announcement in which management, either alone or with a group of equity investors,
makes an offer to buy the firm. Management-initiated buyouts are buyouts in which
management made the first offer to buy the firm. Outside-party initiated buyouts are
buyouts in which an outside party made the first offer to buy the firm. Failed buyouts
are firms that continue to have publicly traded stock two years after the initial buyout
offer. Number of firms in each category is reported (percentage of total sample in
parentheses)
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Table 2. Chronology of events during management buyout attempts for a sample of
111 firms in the period 1984 to 1987. A management buyout attempt is defined as
any announcement in which management, either alone or with a group of equity
investors, makes an offer to buy the firm. The cumulative number of firms with
occurrence of event by month-end is reported.

n.a. = not applicable.
aCumulative abnormal returns are the summation of abnormal returns on day -1, 0,
+1. Day 0 is the day the event was announced in the Wall Street Journal or came over
the Dow Jones News Wire. Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between
realized returns and market-model expected returns. The CRSP (NASDAQ) valueweighted index is used as the market index for CRSP (NASDAQ) firms. The market
model is estimated using 200 daily returns 120 days prior to the initial buyout
announcement.
bZ-statistics calculated according to the standardized prediction errors method given in
the Appendix of Dodd and Warner (1983).
cThe time period is 12 months before the MBO offer to the month of the MBO offer.
dCompetitive bid is defined as any bid from an outside party (other than a blockholder)
after the initial offer.
eManagerial resistance is defined as taking anyone of the following actions: (1)
adopting an antitakeover amendment; (2) litigating an outside bidder; (3) increasing
management’s effective stake by buying back shares, debt for equity swap,
repurchase of convertible preferred or convertible debt for cash, private placement of
equity, or repurchase of shares from an investor.
fReport of a SEC 13D filing of a block acquisition of 5% or more in either the Wall
Street Journal or the Dow Jones News Wire.
gBlockholder actions are defined as reports in the financial press of blockholder
statements or actions other than changes in shareholdings, alone.
hSignificant at the 1% level.
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Table 3. Increases in blockholdings around management buyout attempts for a sample

of 111 firms in the period 1984 to 1987. A management buyout attempt is defined as
any announcement in which management, either alone or with a group of equity
investors, makes an offer to buy the firm.

n.a. = not applicable.
aNew post-offer blockholders are those whose initial 13D filing is announced between
30 days and up to 24 months after the management buyout offer.
bNew pre-offer blockholders are those whose initial 13D filing is announced between
12 months prior to the management buyout offer and up to 30 days after the
management buyout offer.
cOld blockholders are those who own shares 12 months prior to the management
buyout offer.
dThe number of days used is for the first block acquisition after the MBO
announcement, and for the first block acquisition before the MBO announcement when
there are multiple acquisitions.
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Table 4. Number of different types of blockholders for a sample of 111 firms with a
management buyout attempt in the period 1984 to 1987. A management buyout
attempt is defined as any announcement in which management, either alone or with a
group of equity investors, makes an offer to buy the firm.

aSee

notes Table 3.
of some of the blockholders in my sample that I classify as equity-holding
companies are: Jamie Securities Co., Gabelli Group, and Mutual Shares Corp.
cThe blockholders in the sample whom I classify as frequent acquirers are: Victor
Posner, Asher Edelman, the Bass brothers, Paul Bilzerian, Ivan Boesky, Carl Icahn,
Irwin Jacobs, Samuel Belzberg, the Dart Group, Ronald Perelman, and David Murdock.
d
A miscellaneous corporation is company that does not provide financial services of
any kind. An example of some of the firms in my sample that I classify as
miscellaneous corporations are Macmillan, Inc., Pillsbury, and Fisher Foods, Inc.
eA miscellaneous individual is an individual other than a frequent acquirer. Examples of
individuals that I classify as miscellaneous in my sample are Beth A. Vanderberg, Mrs.
Daryl D. Jones, and Steven J. Kumble.
bExamples
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fBlockholders

are classified as brokerage houses if that is the characterization in the
proxy statement or the financial press. The one brokerage house in my sample is
Spear, Leeds, & Kellog.
gBlockholders are classified as investment counsel firms if that is the characterization
in the proxy statement or the financial press. Examples of investment counsel firms in
my sample are First Pacific Advisors, Inc., Templeton Investment Counsel, Inc., and
William D. Witt, Inc.
hMiscellaneous financial services firms are firms that provide several financial services,
including investment banking services. Examples of miscellaneous financial service
firms in my sample are Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, T. Rowe Price Associates,
PaineWebber Inc.
iActive blockholders are those who are reported as taking some type of action other
than the acquisition of shares during the 12 months prior to the MBO offer or
afterwards.
jChi-square tests are used to test various associations; the association between new
blockholder types and whether the block is acquired pre-offer or post-offer is not
statistically significant at conventional levels; the association between new blockholder
types and old blockholder types is statistically significant at the 1% level; the
association between whether the new block is acquired pre-offer or post-offer and the
blockholder's active participation in the contest is not statistically significant at
conventional levels; and the association between whether the blockholder is new or
old, and the blockholder's active participation in the contest is statistically significant
at the 1% level.
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Table 5. Number of different types of actions taken by different typesa of blockholders

around a management buyout attempt for a sample of 111 firms in the period 1984 to
1987.b A management buyout attempt is defined as any announcement in which
management, either alone or with a group of equity investors, makes an offer to buy
the firm (percentage of total actions shown in parentheses).

n.a. = not applicable.
aFor definitions of different types, see notes to Tables 3 and 4.
bThe time period is 12 months before the MBO offer until the buyout is completed, or
24 months after the MBO offer in the case of failed buyouts.
cChi-square tests are used to test various associations: The association between
blockholder type and action type is statistically significant at the 10% level for postblock acquisitions only; the association between types of blockholders taking actions
and whether the block is a acquired before or after the MBO offer is statistically
significant at the 1% level; the association between types of actions and whether the
block is a acquired before or after the MBO offer is not statistically significant; and the
association between types of actions taken by new pre-offer blockholders and whether
the action is taken before or after the MBO offer is not statistically significant.
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Table 6. The relation between a higher offer from either management or an outside
third-party other than a blockholder after an initial management buyout offer and
ownership structure and contest events for a sample of 111 firms in the period 1984
to 1987. A management buyout offer is defined as any announcement in which
management, either alone or with a group of equity investors, makes an offer to buy
the firm (p-value for significance of coefficient in parentheses).

aAll

firm characteristics measured during the period 12 months prior to the MBO offer
to the higher offer. For firms with no higher offer measured to the buyout completion,
or 24 months after the MBO offer in the case of failed buyouts.
bSee notes to Table 2.
cTotal equity value is the number of shares outstanding times price per share one
month prior to the initial buyout offer.
d
Inside holdings are measured 12 months prior to the MBO offer.
eInstitutional holdings are total monthly institutional holdings measured in the month
of the MBO offer.
fOld 13D outside holdings are total 13D holdings measured 12 months prior to the
MBO offer.
gFor definitions of blockholder types see notes to Tables 3 and 4.
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Table 7. The relation between the successful takeover of the firm by an outside party
and ownership structure and contest events for a sample of 111 firms in the period
1984 to 1987. A management buyout offer is defined as any announcement in which
management, either alone or with a group of equity investors, makes an offer to buy
the firm (p-value for significance of coefficient in parentheses).

aFor

definitions of independent variables, see notes to Table 6.
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Figure 1

Average level of monthly outside blockholdings around management buyout attempts
for a sample of 111 firms in the period 1984 to 1987. A management buyout attempt
is defined as any announcement in which management, either alone or with a group of
equity investors, makes an offer to buy the firm. Total institutional holdings for each
firm is the total percentage of shares outstanding held by all institutional investors
(both 13F and 13G filers). Total 13D holdings for each firm is the sum of each 13D
blockholder's highest holdings within that month. Total outside holdings is the sum of
total institutional and total 13D holdings.
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